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SO MUCH UP IN THE AIR: THE CARBON DIOXIDE
DEBATE AND COAL PLANT PERMITTING IN VIRGINIA
SAM ROBINSON*
In Appalachian Voices v. State Air Pollution Control Board,1 the
Circuit Court of the City of Richmond weighed in on an extremely hotly-
contested issue when it rejected the claim that carbon dioxide (“CO2”) is a
regulated pollutant under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), and that therefore
any new coal-fired energy plants in Virginia must use the Best Available
Control Technology (“BACT”) to capture CO2.2 Ruling against the peti-
tioners, a coalition of environmental groups, the court held that carbon di-
oxide is not subject to regulation under the CAA.3 This decision cleared the
way for construction to continue on the 585 megawatts (“MW”) “Virginia
City Hybrid Energy Center” (“VCHEC”) in Wise County, Virginia. As of
this writing, the VCHEC is roughly two-thirds complete4 and on schedule
to begin producing electricity commercially in the summer of 2012.5
Other state courts around the country have similarly rejected
the claim that CO2 is a regulated pollutant under the CAA,6 and recently
the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) confirmed.7 Although the
Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA pushed the EPA to create a
regulatory framework with regard to motor vehicles in 2007,8 the EPA
* J.D. candidate, 2011,William & Mary School of Law. The author would like to thank his
family and friends for their support and the Editorial Board and staff of the Review for
their work in preparing this note for publication.  
1 Appalachian Voices v. State Air Pollution Control Bd., No. 08-3530 (Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 10,
2009).
2 Id. at 2.
3 Id.
4 Virginia City Hybrid Energy Center, DOMINION RESOURCES, INC., http://www.dom.com/
about/stations/fossil/virginia-city-hybrid-energy-center.jsp (last visited Oct. 12, 2010).
5 Id.
6 See, e.g., Utah Chptr. of the Sierra Club v. Air Quality Bd., 226 P.3d 719, 730 (Utah 2009)
(“To date, carbon dioxide is not governed by the [NAAQS], the new source performance
standards, or the ozone protection standards.”).
7 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL RULE: PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION
AND TITLE V GREEN HOUSE GAS TAILORING RULE: FACT SHEET 1–5 (2010), available at
http://www.epa.gov/nsr/documents/20100413fs.pdf (providing a timeline for future regulation
of greenhouse gases under the CAA).
8 549 U.S. 497, 500 (2007).
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has only recently begun to release regulations.9 Many believe these rules
are merely a means to prod Congress to act, potentially delaying regula-
tion further as various statutory options are debated.10 Despite being
widely regarded as a leading cause of global warming,11 emission of CO2
from coal-powered energy plants is almost entirely unregulated in the
United States.12 This is bound to change, and the result of regulation
will likely be to raise, possibly substantially, the cost of producing elec-
tricity from coal.13
Despite the uncertainty over the future of CO2 emissions regula-
tion, Virginia continues to stake its energy future on the most carbon-
intensive fuel available.14 As of this writing, Virginia was in the process
9 See Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,886 (April 24, 2009) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1) [hereinafter Endangerment Finding].
10 See Jack M. Beermann, The Turn Toward Congress in Administrative Law, 89 B.U. L.
REV. 727, 732 (2009) (“By rejecting the executive branch’s arguments for deference to
administrative policy, and by relying on its understanding of congressional intent, the
Court placed responsibility for global warming policy on Congress.”). The Obama admin-
istration has also turned up the pressure on Congress to act. See John M. Broder, Green-
house Gases Imperil Health, E.P.A. Announces, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2009, at A18 (“The
administration has used the [endangerment] finding as a prod to Congress, saying that
if lawmakers do not act to control greenhouse gas pollution it will use its rule-making power
to do so. At the same time, the [P]resident and his top environmental aides have said that
they prefer such a major step be taken through the legislative process.”).
11 See 549 U.S. at 497, 505, 521, 533 (noting that “[t]he harms associated with climate
change are serious and well recognized.”) The Court went on to question whether the
EPA “has abdicated its responsibility under the [CAA] to regulate the emissions of four
greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide.” Id. at 521. After reviewing the science of
global warming, the Court found that the EPA had indeed “refused to comply with [the
CAA’s] clear statutory command.” Id. at 533.
12 Patrick Parenteau, Lead, Follow, or Get Out of the Way: The States Tackle Climate Change
with Little Help from Washington, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1453, 1455–56 (2008).
13 ABT ASSOCIATES INC., ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF DOMINION VIRGINIA POWER’S
COAL-FIRED POWER PLANT IN WISE COUNTY, VIRGINIA, COMPARED TO INVESTMENTS IN
ENERGY EFFICIENCY ES-2 (2009) [hereinafter ASSESSING THE IMPACT], available at http://
wiseenergyforvirginia.org/downloads/Executive%20Summary_Wise%20County
%20Coal%20Plant_01-06-09.pdf (analyzing the cost of electricity under various carbon taxa-
tion models and concluding that carbon regulation will likely raise consumer electric rates).
14 See MASS. INST. TECH., THE FUTURE OF COAL: OPTIONS FOR A CARBON-CONSTRAINED
WORLD 5 (2007) (noting the United States’ dependence on coal to produce electricity);
Parenteau, supra note 12, at 1456. See also Amy C. Christian, Designing a Carbon Tax:
The Introduction of the Carbon-Burned Tax (CBT), 10 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 221,
232 (1992) (noting that “[p]er unit of energy produced, burning coal emits seventy-five
percent more carbon dioxide than burning natural gas and twenty-two percent more than
burning oil.”).
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of building or permitting massive new coal-fired energy plants in Wise
and Surry Counties.15 More are likely to follow.16
These multi-billion dollar plants and the electricity they produce
will ultimately be purchased by the citizens of Virginia.17 As an energy-
market regulating state, Virginia’s legislature has given the State Cor-
poration Commission (“SCC”) a significant role in ensuring that consumers
are protected from unnecessarily high utility rates.18 Virginia must play
a part in the effort to control carbon dioxide emissions, if not for altruistic
reasons related to climate change, then for the more practical reason that
national standards are likely to raise the cost of producing electricity from
coal and the state should not lock itself in to these higher rates.19 Simply
put, permitting new coal-powered energy plants is shortsighted given
the instability in the carbon regulatory regime and the added costs
which will likely accompany eventual regulation.20
This note will develop the case against permitting new coal-
powered plants in four parts. Part I will examine Virginia’s energy mix and
needs, focusing special attention on the fight over VCHEC to provide a local
context for the larger debate. Part II will discuss efforts at the federal
level to regulate CO2 emissions. This section will include descriptions of
the major types of regulation that have been proposed, focusing particular
emphasis on the cap-and-trade bill passed in the House and recently
proposed in similar form in the Senate. Part III will look at the ways
other states have responded to the lack of leadership in Washington. The
most prevalent of these efforts are so-called renewable portfolio stan-
dards (“RPS”) which are currently in force in twenty-nine states.21 The
concluding section will pull together the themes developed in the paper
to explain why continuing to expand the percentage of Virginia’s energy
portfolio provided by coal-powered plants without meaningful efforts to en-
courage renewables and energy efficiency is misguided, both for consum-
ers and as a matter of environmental policy. Instead, the Commonwealth
15 Editorial, Power Play, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, May 22, 2009, at A12 (in addition
to discussing the two plants, the article notes that “vocal opposition” has accompanied
plans for new electricity generation facilities).
16 See id.
17 See ASSESSING THE IMPACT, supra note 13, at ES-2.
18 VA. CODE ANN. § 56-581 (2009).
19 See ASSESSING THE IMPACT, supra note 13, at ES-2.
20 See id. at ES-1 to ES-2.
21 See RPS Policies, DSIRE: DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY,
http://www.dsireusa.org/summarymaps/index.cfm?ee=1&RE=1 (follow the RPS Policies
Hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 12, 2010).
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should pursue conservation, efficiency gains, and diversification to secure
an affordable and more sustainable energy future.
I. COAL AND VIRGINIA’S ENERGY NEEDS
Virginia’s electricity is provided by two types of producers: electric
companies22 and electric cooperatives.23 In 2007, these producers gener-
ated a total of roughly 78.3 million kilowatt-hours of electricity24 from a
mix of sources made up primarily of coal (44.3%), nuclear (34.1%) and nat-
ural gas (13.6%), as well as smaller amounts of renewable sources such
as hydroelectric, biomass and wind (total of 5.4%).25 Virginia also imports
a considerable amount of electricity from neighboring states; in recent
years imported electricity has accounted for nearly a third of all electric-
ity used.26 In fact, Virginia is second only to California in electricity im-
ports.27 As the population of Virginia grows over the next decade, demand
for electricity is expected to increase by some 4000 MW—enough to power
more than a million homes and businesses.28
22 See Electricity in Virginia, VIRGINIA PLACES, http://www.virginiaplaces.org/energy
/electricity.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2010) (explaining the structure of electricity provision
in Virginia). Examples of private companies include: American Electric Power, Old Do-
minion Power, and Dominion Resources (operating under various names including Virginia
Electric & Power Co.). Electric Companies Regulated by the SCC, VA. STATE CORP. COMM’N,
http://www.scc.virginia.gov/pue/elec/reg_cos.aspx (last visited Oct. 12, 2010). See also
Dominion: 100 Years Going Strong, DOMINION RESOURCES, INC., http://www.dom
.com/about/anniversary.jsp (last visited Oct. 12, 2010). All these entities will be referred
to throughout this note as Dominion.
23 There are thirteen electric cooperatives serving Virginia. See VA. STATE CORP.
COMM’N, supra note 22.
24 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA 0348(01)/2, STATE ELECTRICITY
PROFILES 2007, 313 tbl.A.1(2010) [hereinafter STATE ELECTRICITY PROFILES 2007],
available at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/ftproot/electricity/stateprofiles/07st_profiles/062907.pdf.
25 See Virginia Electric Energy Net Generation 2007, VA. CTR. FOR COAL & ENERGY
RESEARCH, http://www.energy.vt.edu/vept/electric/netgeneration_year.asp?yr=2007 (last
visited Oct. 12, 2010); Virginia Renewables, VA. CTR. FOR COAL & ENERGY RESEARCH,
http://www.energy.vt.edu/vept/renewables/index.asp (last visited October 12, 2010).
26 See VA. COAL & ENERGY COMM’N, ANNUAL EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE VIRGINIA COAL
AND ENERGY COMMISSION (2008), available at http://leg2.state.va.us/DLS/h&sdocs.nsf/
5c7ff392dd0ce64d85256ec400674ecb/53e5b42f6bb4cd908525726c00534512?
OpenDocument (noting that electricity imports made up 29.4% of 2008 usage).
27 See STATE ELECTRICITY PROFILES 2007, supra note 24, at 313–14. In 2007, California’s
net retail electricity sales exceeded net generation by a little over 50,000 MWh. Virginia’s
sales exceeded supply by roughly 33,000 MWh. Id.
28 DOMINION RESOURCES, INC., 2008 SUMMARY ANNUAL REPORT 20 (2008), available at
http://www.dom.com/investors/annual2008/domannual.pdf.
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Virginia’s electricity producers operate in a regulated market that
has been in considerable flux over the last ten years. In 1999, the Virginia
legislature joined a trend then sweeping the nation and substantially
deregulated its electricity markets.29 Prior to 1999, Virginia maintained
a regulated market in which consumers had little choice of energy pro-
vider.30 The theory behind deregulation, in Virginia and elsewhere, was
that by allowing market forces to run their course, competition by new
energy providers would force the entrenched utilities to offer lower prices
and the consumer would benefit.31 Deregulation took effect January 1,
2001, allowing customers a choice of electricity provider and imposing
rate caps to allow adjustment to the new regime.32 After an initial flurry of
interest by companies seeking to sell electricity in Virginia,33 it quickly
became apparent that rate caps designed to protect consumers from
rapid increases in electricity prices were too low to encourage new elec-
tricity suppliers to enter the market.34 Other states experienced similar
problems: across the country states that had deregulated their energy
markets grappled with dramatically higher consumer electricity prices
as the promise of increased competition proved hollow and fuel costs
rose.35 When new producers failed to enter the market in Virginia,36 the
29 See Maryann Haggerty, It’s No ‘Off’ Switch: That’s Deregulation With a Small ‘De-’,
WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 1999, at H6; Terence O’Hara & Amit R. Paley, Electricity
Deregulation: High Cost, Unmet Promises, WASH. POST, March 12, 2006, at A01 (noting
that in the late 1990’s nearly half of all states, including Maryland and Virginia, under-
took some form of deregulation).
30 See Del Jones, States Take Varied Routes to Energy Deregulation, USA TODAY (Feb. 1,
2001, 6:21 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/consumer/2001-02-01-states.htm (noting
that two years after deregulation legislation was enacted, still only five percent of
customers in Virginia were eligible to choose their energy provider).
31 See David B. Spence, The Politics of Electricity Restructuring: Theory vs. Practice, 40
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 417, 446–47 (2005).
32 See VA. CODE ANN. § 56-582 (2009). The legislature was so optimistic about the
potential for competition that the law allowed utilities to petition for rate cap termination
early, in 2004, in areas where “effectively competitive market[s]” had developed. See id.
33 Greg Edwards, Deregulation Starts Jan. 1: Electricity Competition Picture Still is
Unclear, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Dec. 16, 2001, at A1 (noting that “about two dozen
power-plant projects, representing several thousand megawatts of electricity, have been
announced in Virginia by companies other than those associated with Virginia utilities”).
34 Peter Behr, Region’s Electric Rates Kept in Check—for Now: Rate Caps Slow Hoped-For
Competition, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2001, at A1. See also Peter Behr, Electricity Bills
Likely to Jump When Price Caps Expire, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2004, at E1.
35 See Terence O’Hara & Amit R. Paley, Electricity Deregulation: High Cost, Unmet
Promises; Competition a ‘Myth’ as Prices Spiral Upward, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2006,
at A1.
36 Id. (noting that of Virginia’s 3.2 million electric customers, only 1450 had switched to
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legislature was forced to face the reality that, without action, when rate
caps expired the state energy market would be deregulated, and consumer
rates would be determined by the few utilities with monopoly shares of the
electricity market.37 In response to this dilemma, the legislature first ex-
tended rate caps through 2010, and then moved to re-regulate the market.38
New regulations passed in 200739 have once again committed most
Virginians to the “incumbent” utility in their area40 and restored the role
of the state in determining “fair rates of return on common equity . . .
consistent with the public interest.”41 The SCC is empowered to determine
the rate of return an electricity-producing utility may earn on equity,
also known as the “rate base.”42 While this might seem onerous, the new
regulations built in generous benefits for the major utilities, particularly
for Dominion Energy which had lobbied intensely for the bill.43 These
benefits include significant incentives for new construction,44 various
“Performance Incentives,”45 as well as guaranteed return on equity not less
than the average performance of similar utilities.46
The new regulations also include measures intended to spur
investment in renewable energy production.47 The voluntary RPS enacted
a new provider, and those who did actually switched to a more expensive, environmentally
friendly supplier).
37 See Behr, Electricity Bills Likely to Jump When Price Caps Expire, supra note 34.
38 See id.
39 2007 Va. Acts Ch. 2405–07 (codified as amended in VA. CODE ANN. §§ 56–576 et seq.).
40 VA. CODE ANN. § 56-577(A)(3) (2009).
41 Id. § 56-585.1.
42 Id. § 56-576 et. seq.; Electric Rates in Virginia, VA. STATE CORP. COMM’N (2010), available
at http://www.scc.virginia.gov/comm/howerates.pdf.
43 See Amy Gardner & Michael D. Shear, State Passes Overhaul Backed by Dominion:
Critics Say Measure Will Bring Higher Rates, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2007, at B5; Rebecca
Smith, Incentives for Utility stir Debate—Dominion Resources Wins Generous Terms as
Virginia Ends Open Power Market, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2007, at A14.
44 VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.1(A)(6) (2009). “A utility that constructs [specified generation
plants and unit modification] shall have the right to recover the costs of the facility . . .
plus, as an incentive to undertake such projects, an enhanced rate of return on common
equity.” Id. These incentives amount to a two percent additional return on the mandated
base rate depending on the type of plan. Smith, supra note 43 (noting that with these added
“boosts,” utilities could see returns on equity of around fourteen percent).
45 VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.1(A)(2)(c) (2009). These incentives are apparently at the
discretion of the Commission and relate to “generating plant performance, customer service,
and operating efficiency.” Id.
46 VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.1(A) (2009). If on the other hand, the combined return on
equity exceeds the average, the Commission is empowered to lower the rates or allow the
utility to keep forty percent of the excess and return the rest to customers. See id.
47 See VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.2 (2009).
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by the legislature offers utilities who wish to participate further perfor-
mance incentives for the sale of electricity produced from renewable
sources.48 Virginia’s RPS is discussed in greater detail in Part III, and it
is only necessary to note here that the voluntary RPS is so toothless and
riddled with exceptions and loopholes that utilities may well qualify for
its performance incentives through 2015 and beyond without developing
any new sources of renewable energy.49
Despite the generous give-aways, Virginia’s re-regulation represents
a return to the paradigm which has ruled electricity markets across the
country since the early days of the electricity industry.50 Given the inherent
volatility of electricity markets, which are typified by inelastic but unpre-
dictable demand as well as characteristics, especially in the production
process, of natural monopoly,51 many questioned whether deregulation of
this sector was wise.52 The disastrous experience of deregulating states
such as California and Maryland, among others, demonstrates the dangers
associated with deregulated electricity markets.53
Virginia has returned to the so-called “traditional rate formula”
which balances consumer expectations and the profitability of the utili-
ties in the form of cost-of-service rate-making.54 In essence, this form of
state oversight creates a partnership between the people of Virginia and
48 Id.
49 See Justin W. Curtis, My Two Cents Per Kilowatt-Hour: Virginia’s Renewable Energy
Portfolio Standard, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 755, 779 (2008) (arguing that loopholes in the
RPS lower the percentage of electricity produced from renewables in order to qualify for
the Performance Incentive from 4% to 2.3%). Given that Virginia already produces in
excess of three percent of its electricity from hydroelectric plants and other existing
renewable sources, many utilities may already qualify for the incentives without any new
production. See id. Dominion Energy, for example, has no concrete plans to develop
substantial new renewable resources and, hydroelectric generation aside, attains the RPS
goal by purchasing existing renewable energy credits. See VIRGINIA ELECTRIC AND POWER
COMPANY, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION ON RENEWABLE
ENERGY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH § 56-585.2.H OF THE CODE OF VIRGINIA 8 (2009), available at
http://www.dom.com/about/stations/renewable/pdf/renewable_energy_report_103009.pdf.
50 See Spence, supra note 31, at 421.
51 John E. Kwoka, Jr., Twenty Five Years of Deregulation: Lessons for Electric Power, 33 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 885, 886 (2002).
52 Id.
53 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., How Will the California Debacle Affect Energy Deregulation,
54 ADMIN. L. REV. 389, 389–90 (2002); Thomas A. Firey, Fixing Maryland’s Electricity
Problem, CATO INST. (Jun. 23, 2006), http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6443.
54 See Sidney A. Shapiro & Joseph P. Tomain, Rethinking Reform of Electricity Markets,
40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 497, 508 (2005); Gardner & Shear, supra note 43, at B5; STATE
CORP. COMM’N, supra note 42.
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the utilities that serve them. The balance in this partnership is mediated
by the SCC, which is charged with allowing utilities a “ ‘fair’ rate of return
(profit) on their ‘rate base.’ ”55 The SCC is involved in every major decision
made by the utilities regarding rate changes, new projects and alterations
to existing facilities.56 This regulatory scheme has served Virginia’s cus-
tomers well: the cost of electricity to consumers is relatively low. Virgin-
ians pay an average of just 9.62¢ per kilowatt hour as compared to a
national average of 11.26¢.57
A. New Plants to Meet New Demand
It is in this regulatory environment that Virginia utilities have
been planning how they will respond to increased demand over the coming
years.58 A series of new coal-fired generation plants have been proposed.59
Virginia currently has two plants in development, Dominion’s 585 MW
“Virginia City Hybrid Energy Center” in Wise County, and the 1500 MW
55 VA. STATE CORP. COMM’N, supra note 42.
56 See VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.1 (2009). “Nothing in this section shall preclude the
Commission from determining, during any proceeding authorized or required by this section,
the reasonableness or prudence of any cost incurred or projected to be incurred, by a
utility in connection with the subject of the proceeding.” Id. § 56-585.1(D).
57 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0348(2008), ELECTRIC POWER
ANNUAL 2008 69 fig.7.5 (2010), available at www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epa.pdf.
Virginia also compares favorably to several states in the region: Maryland for example
pays an average of 13.84¢ per kilowatt hour while North Carolina pays 9.52¢. Id. West
Virginia and Kentucky both pay less, however, at 7.06¢ and 7.94¢ respectively. Id.
58 Increased demand in the next decade alone is very difficult to model, leading to widely
varying estimates of growth depending on the model used. Nationwide, electricity demand
is expected to grow roughly one percent per year through 2030. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/EIA-0383(2009), ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2009, 71 (2009).
Virginia’s Energy Plan for 2007 suggested that by 2016, without significant shifts in
consumption, peak demand would jump nearly twenty-three percent above 2005 levels.
See DEP’T OF MINES, MINERALS AND ENERGY, THE VIRGINIA ENERGY PLAN 40 (2007),
available at http://www.dmme.virginia.gov/DE/VAEnergyPlan/2007VEP-Full .pdf. An oft-
repeated claim is that electricity demand grew by forty percent between 1997 and 2007.
See David A. Fahrenthold, Increasing Greenhouse Emissions Decried, WASH. POST, Apr.
13, 2007, at B1; Sandhya Somashekhar, Dominion Virginia has Inflated Power Needs,
Some Experts Say; Opponents’ Advisors Push Alternatives to High-Voltage Lines, WASH.
POST, Jan. 28, 2007, at C3. However, according to the Energy Information Admin-
istration, during this period, total revenues rose forty-eight percent. See STATE
ELECTRICITY PROFILES 2007, supra note 24, at 281 tbl.8.
59 See Proposed Coal Plants in Virginia, SOURCEWATCH, http://www.sourcewatch.org
/index.php?title=Category:Proposed_coal_plants_in_Virginia (last modified Sept. 11,
2008) (listing recent proposed plants in Wise, Surry, and Sussex Counties).
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Cypress Creek Power Station in Surry County proposed by Old Dominion
Electric Cooperative.60 Both have faced substantial opposition from various
groups, which claim that environmental costs are prohibitively high.61 The
Surry plant, which if completed as proposed would be the largest coal-
fired plant in the state,62 has been delayed. VCHEC, however, appears to
have cleared regulatory hurdles and legal challenges, which will allow it
to complete construction and begin operation.63
The fight over VCHEC presents an interesting case study, because
it offers a view into the complicated world of electric plant permitting in
Virginia, as well as the vastly more complicated world of air quality regu-
lation at the national level.
B. The Virginia City Hybrid Energy Center
1. Legislative Background
Groundwork for the construction of new plants in Southwestern
Virginia was laid by the Virginia legislature in the form of two bills. In
2004, the legislature amended the Virginia Electric Utility Restructuring
Act by adding a new subsection, section 56-585(G) of the Virginia Code,
designed to promote construction by allowing utilities to recover the costs
of construction of new facilities “plus a fair rate of return.”64 Dominion was
apparently not satisfied that the SCC definition of fairness would match
its own, and lobbied vigorously for a heightened rate of return.65 The SCC
60 See Dominion Seeks Approval for Va. Coal Power Plant, REUTERS, July 17, 2007,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1721333920070717; Tiny Virginia Town
Approves Giant Coal-Fired Power Plant, ENVTL. NEWS SERV. (Feb. 2, 2010), http://www
.ens-newswire.com/ens/feb2010/2010-02-02-092.html.
61 See Dominion’s Wise Co. Coal-fired Power Plant Violates Federal law, Clean Energy
Advocates Tell Court, S. ENVTL. L. CTR. (July 31, 2009), http://www.southernenvironment
.org/newsroom/press_releases/2009_07_31_court_hears_wise_county_caa_arguments;
Tiny Virginia Town Approves Giant Coal-Fired Power Plant, supra note 60.
62 Rex Springston, Should a Coal-Fired Power Plant be Built in Surry?; No: It’s Bad for
the Environment, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, May 17, 2009, at A8.
63 See Linda McNatt, Company Delays Planned Surry County Coal Plant, THE VIRGINIAN-
PILOT (Sept. 9, 2010), http://hamptonroads.com/2010/09/company-delays-planned-surry
-county-coal-plant; DOMINION RESOURCES, INC., supra note 4.
64 2004 Va. Acts 1268, 1274 (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585 (1999))
(repealed 2007). The amendment also instructed the SCC to “liberally construe the
provisions of this title” when deciding whether to approve construction. Id.
65 See, e.g., Va. Elec. & Power Co., No. PUE-2007-00066 (Va. State Corp. Comm’n July 13,
2007) (application for approval, certification, and rate adjustment) [hereinafter VCHEC
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responded that it could not determine a fair rate of return based on the
incomplete application information before it.66 In order to clarify how
much of a give-away Dominion would receive, the legislature passed a
second piece of legislation in 2007, repealing section 56-585(G).67 The new
legislation specified that companies constructing new “[c]arbon capture
compatible, clean-coal powered” plants “that utilize Virginia coal and [are]
located in the coalfield region of the Commonwealth”68 would receive a
two percent increase in return on equity for the first ten to twenty years
of the life of the plant.69
2. State Corporations Commission Process
Three months after this new incentive program was signed into law,
on July 13, 2007, Dominion submitted an application to the SCC for per-
mits to build a $1.62 billion plant in Wise County.70 Under Virginia law,
the SCC may “determine the reasonableness or prudence”71 of expenditures
for new energy facilities and approve such facilities where “public conve-
nience and necessity require the exercise of such right or privilege.”72
Dominion’s application described the proposed plant as a “ ‘carbon capture
compatible, clean-coal powered’ 585 MW (nominal) coal-fueled generating
plant.”73 The plant will employ two circulating fluidized bed74 (“CFB”)
Application] (Direct Testimony of E. Paul Hilton).
66 Va. Electric and Power Co., No. PUE-2006-00075 (Va. State Corp. Comm’n Nov. 1,
2006) (final order).
67 2007 Va. Acts 2402, 2402.
68 2007 Va. Acts 2402, 2415–16 (codified as amended in VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585, et seq.
(2007)). “To ensure a reliable and adequate supply of electricity . . . a utility may at any
time . . . petition the Commission for approval of a rate adjustment clause for recovery
on a timely and current basis from customers of the costs of . . . a coal-fueled generation
facility that utilizes Virginia coal and is located in the coalfield region of the Common-
wealth . . . . A utility that constructs any such facility shall have the right to recover the
costs of the facility . . . plus, as an incentive to undertake such projects, an enhanced rate
of return on common equity . . . .” Id. § 56-585.1(A)(6).
69 See Smith, supra note 43.
70 See VCHEC Application, supra note 65, at 1.
71 VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.1(D) (2010).
72 Id. § 56-265.2.
73 VCHEC Application, supra note 65, at 4.
74 The CFB boilers which will power the plant operate by suspending solid fuels on jets of
injected air during the combustion process. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE JEA LARGE-
SCALE CFB COMBUSTION DEMONSTRATION PROJECT 14 (2003), available at http://www.netl
.doe.gov/technologies/coalpower/cctc/topicalreports/pdfs/topical22.pdf. These advanced
boilers offer numerous advantages over traditional boilers, including increased combustion
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boilers to power its generator and will also be equipped with a variety of
filters and scrubbers to reduce air pollutants.75 Although the plant was
designed to accommodate the installation of carbon capture technology in
the future,76 presumably meaning that some amount of space has been
left for anticipated equipment, the application noted that “no such carbon
capture technology is currently [commercially] available.”77
In addition to requesting approval to construct the plant, Dominion
simultaneously applied for permission to receive the return on equity in-
centive provided for in section 56-585.1.78 The application requested a
return on equity of 13.75% for funds used to build the VCHEC.79
The SCC began review of the application, and an initial public
hearing was scheduled for January 8, 2008.80 In the meantime, significant
opposition to the plant was building among environmental groups.81 A
number of them, including the Southern Environmental Law Center, the
Sierra Club, and Appalachian Voices joined in challenging the application
before the SCC.82 The SCC received over 700 public comments on the
application, with the vast majority requesting that it be denied.83 At the
hearing, which ultimately had to be extended to four days,84 the SCC
commissioners heard testimony from 121 public witnesses, most of whom
efficiency, reduced nitrogen oxide (NOx) and sulfur dioxide (SO2) emissions and flexibility
of fuel choice. Id. According to the application, VCHEC will take advantage of the last of
these advantages by burning a mixture of different fuels including primarily “run-of-
mine” coal, but also waste coal and biomass (wood waste). See VCHEC Application, supra
note 65, at 5.
75 VCHEC Application, supra note 65, at 5 (these pollutants include sulfur dioxide,
nitrogen oxide, particulate matter, and mercury).
76 Id. at 4.
77 Id. See also VCHEC Application, supra note 65, at 6 (Direct Testimony of James K.
Martin).
78 VCHEC Application, supra note 65, at 4.
79 Id. This requested rate of return was made up of Dominion’s claimed general rate of
return for equity: 11.75%, and the two percent construction incentives discussed above. Id.
80 See Va. Elec. & Power Co., No. PUE-2007-00066 (Va. State Corp. Comm’n Mar. 31,
2008) (Final Order) [hereinafter Final Order].
81 See Tim Craig, Kaine Irks Environmentalists by Supporting Coal-Burning Plant, WASH.
POST., Mar. 30, 2008, at C1. See also Protesters at St. Paul’s Dominion Power Plant
Charged with Misdemeanors, KINGSPORT TIMES-NEWS (Sept. 15, 2008), http://www
.timesnews.net/article.php?id=9008142.
82 See, e.g., Letter from Caleb A. Jaffee, counsel to the S. Envtl. Law Ctr., to the Honorable
Joel H. Peck, Clerk to the Va. State Corp. Comm’n (Sept. 10, 2007) (on file with author);
see also Final Order, supra note 80 (noting that eight parties had filed notices of partici-
pation in the case).
83 See Final Order, supra note 80, at 2.
84 Id.
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also urged against approval of the application.85 A month after the hearing,
Dominion, along with the Office of the Attorney General and the Staff of
the SCC filed a “Proposed Stipulation and Recommendation” urging ap-
proval of the application.86 The motion reflected negotiations conducted
among these parties and recommended, in addition to approval, a compro-
mise general rate of return on common equity of 11.12% as well as an
additional one percent return pursuant to section 56-585.1(A)(6) of the
Virginia Code87 for utilizing clean coal technology,88 which will apply for
the first twelve years of the plant’s service life.89 The motion also noted
that it was unresolved whether VCHEC would be compatible with carbon
capture but that if the SCC later determined that the plant was compatible,
another one percent return on equity increase would be granted.90 Groups
opposing VCHEC filed post-hearing briefs responding to the Proposed Stipu-
lation and Recommendation, claiming that section 56-585.1(A)(6) of the
Virginia Code violated the Commerce Clause,91 and that new coal plants
were against the public interest.92 These claims were rejected by the SCC in
light of the Virginia legislature’s clear intent that new plants be constructed.93
The SCC formally approved the Joint Motion and Proposed Stipu-
lation and Recommendation on March 31, 2008.94 The Final Order also
noted that while section 56-580(D) of the Virginia Code instructed the
SCC to “give consideration to the effect of the facility . . . on the environ-
ment and establish such conditions as may be desirable or necessary to
minimize adverse environmental impact,”95 the legislation did not require
a “particular level of environmental benefit, or an absence of environmental
85 Id. See, e.g., Memorandum from Madria Barnes, Energy Division, Va. State Corp.
Comm’n, to the Document Control Ctr. (Dec. 6, 2007) (Comment of Christa R. Watters)
(on file with the author).
86 See Joint Motion and Proposed Stipulation and Recommendation, No. PUE-2007-00066
(Va. State Corp. Comm’n Mar. 4, 2008).
87 Id.; VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.1(A)(6) (Supp. 2010).
88 Joint Motion, supra note 86, at 2.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 3.
91 Memorandum of Law of Southern Environmental Law Center, et al., in Opposition to
the Application of Va. Electric and Power Co., No. PUE-2007-00066 3 (Va. State Corp.
Comm’n Mar. 14, 2008). See also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
92 See S. ENVTL. LAW CENT., supra note 61, at 11.
93 See Final Order, supra note 80, at 3; VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.1(A)(6) (Supp. 2010) (“The
construction of any [coal-fired generation] facility described in clause (i) is in the public
interest, and in determining whether to approve such facility, the Commission shall
liberally construe the provisions of this title.”).
94 See Final Order, supra note 80, at 26.
95 Id. at 22.
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harm, as a precondition to approval.”96 Without clear rules to apply, the
SCC required only that Dominion “acquire all environmental and other
approvals and permits necessary to construct and to operate the pro-
posed Coal Plant,” a requirement redundant by its very language.97
The coalition of environmental groups appealed the ruling of the
SCC to the Virginia Supreme Court, again claiming that allowing a height-
ened rate of recovery for a “coal-fueled generation facility that utilizes
Virginia coal”98 violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Consti-
tution.99 The Court rejected this claim, noting that “nothing in the Vir-
ginia statute requires the use of Virginia coal. What is required is the
technology to be able to burn coal found in Virginia. Consequently, the
phrase ‘utilizes Virginia coal’ is descriptive and not prescriptive in con-
tent.”100 While this interpretation renders the legislative language nearly
meaningless because any coal-powered plant would be able to use at least
some of the coal mined in Virginia, this redundance is more likely the fault
of the legislature for passing a meaningless political statement, not the
fault of the Court for creating an imaginative interpretation. In either
case the Court held that the “descriptive” language did not violate the
Commerce Clause and that the plant need only be capable of utilizing
Virginia coal.101
3. Environmental Permits
Even as its application was being considered by the SCC, Dominion
had been at work collecting fifteen environmental impact permits required
for the project to proceed and ensuring compliance with a thick and over-
lapping maze of statutory guidelines.102 In order to be built, VCHEC would
need permits governing water quality, subaqueous land management,
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 23.
98 See Appalachian Voices v. State Corp. Comm’n, 675 S.E.2d 458, 459 (Va. 2009); VA.
CODE ANN. § 56-585.1(A)(6) (Supp. 2010).
99 Appalachian Voices, 675 S.E.2d at 459, 463. The groups also claimed that Dominion’s
application had been prematurely filed, and that the Commission erred as a matter of law
in failing to conduct an independent review of whether the plan would be in the public
interest. Id. at 460. The Supreme Court quickly dismissed these claims as predicated on
a successful challenge to the statute under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 463.
100 Id. at 462.
101 Id.
102 See Comments of the Department of Environmental Quality Concerning the Virginia
Electric and Power Company, No. PUE-2007-00066 4–6 (Nov. 30, 2007).
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erosion and sediment control, storm-water management, solid and hazard-
ous waste management, and of course, air quality.103 These permits are
controlled by various federal, state, and local agencies under statutory
guidance ranging from the Virginia Waste Management Act104 to the
federal CAA, the subject of this note.105
4. The Clean Air Act 
The CAA “instructs [the] EPA to do the impossible: to set standards
strict enough to clean the air.”106 The CAA requires the EPA to ignore
economic considerations in setting air quality standards.107 The CAA
demands that the EPA pursue goals so high that, as experience has shown,
they are effectively beyond the capability of the EPA to implement or
enforce.108 The CAA has been described as “aspirational,”109 a symbolic
piece of legislation designed by Congress to “place a ‘thumb on the scale’ in
favor of more forceful air pollution control.”110
The CAA assigns states a primary role111 in assuring air quality
within their borders by creating and enforcing individualized State Imple-
mentation Plans (“SIP”) which meet or exceed National Ambient Air
Quality Standards (“NAAQS”) set by the EPA.112 The EPA is directed by
the CAA to create a list of pollutants which “cause or contribute to air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare.”113 This endangerment finding sets in motion a series of
103 See id.
104 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1400 et. seq. (Supp. 2010).
105 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–671 (2000).
106 Christopher T. Giovinazzo, Defending Overstatement: The Symbolic Clean Air Act and
Carbon Dioxide, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 99, 99 (2006).
107 See, e.g., Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 464 (2001).
108 Giovinazzo, supra note 106, at 99 (noting that “[i]n the more than thirty-five years
since the CAA was enacted, [the] EPA, the states, and regulated parties have failed repeat-
edly to meet . . . mandates on time and as written.”).
109 Id.
110 Id. at 100.
111 See John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV.
1183, 1191–92 (1995) for more information on the distribution of environmental regulatory
power between the states and the federal government.
112 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(1) (2000). States are required to submit a plan con-
taining “enforceable emissions limitations and other control measures, means, or
techniques . . . as well as schedules and timetables for compliance, as may be necessary
or appropriate to meet the [air quality] requirements of this [Act].” Id. § 7410(a)(2)(A).
113 Id. § 7407.
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regulations under the CAA.114 Once it has been determined that a pollut-
ant endangers public health or welfare, states must adopt a series of mea-
sures to monitor and reduce emissions.115 To date, the EPA has listed six
common pollutants, called “criteria pollutants” on this list.116 Another 187
hazardous air pollutants must be controlled to the maximum degree
achievable.117
In areas that are currently meeting the target NAAQS, states
must ensure Prevention of Serious Deterioration (“PSD”) through the
implementation of BACT, defined as “an emission limitation based on
the maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation
under this Act.”118 Section 111 of the CAA requires the EPA to adopt
nationally uniform “new source performance standards” that must be
applied by the states in determining whether to permit new sources of air
pollution.119 Amendments, added in 1990, establish comprehensive guide-
lines for state permit programs regulating stationary sources of air pol-
lution such as energy generation plants.120
All PSD programs require that new major stationary sources of
air pollution undergo “new source review” to ensure that BACT for the
criteria pollutants is utilized.121 This review is conducted using a five-step
“top-down method,” which requires the applicant to adopt the most
stringent control technology, unless it can show that the technology is
not achievable.122
114 Lisa Heinzerling, Massachusetts v. EPA, 22 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 301, 309 (2007).
115 See Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans,
40 C.F.R. § 51 (2010) for information about what states must include in their SIPs, and
how they are to be submitted; see also infra note 116 and associated text.
116 See What are the Six Common Air Pollutants?, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www
.epa.gov/air/urbanair (last updated July 1, 2010). The six criteria pollutants are carbon
monoxide (CO), lead (Pb), nitrogen oxides (NOx), ozone (O3), particulate matter (PM), and
sulfur dioxide (SO2). Id. States must report whether they are in compliance with the
standards set, and the CAA contains very specific requirements and timelines for areas
shown not to be meeting the NAAQS goals. Id.
117 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2000). See also The Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990 List of Hazardous Air Pollutants, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
ttn/atw/orig189.html (last updated Nov. 12, 2008).
118 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2006) (emphasis added); see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY, NEW SOURCE REVIEW WORKSHOP MANUAL: PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT
DETERIORATION AND NONATTAINMENT AREA PERMITTING B.1 (1990) (draft), http://www
.epa.gov/ttn/nsr/gen/wkshpman.pdf [hereinafter NEW SOURCE REVIEW WORKSHOP MANUAL].
119 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(b)(1)(A), 7411(c)(1), 7411(f) (2006).
120 Id. § 7661.
121 See NEW SOURCE REVIEW WORKSHOP MANUAL, supra note 118.
122 Id. at B.5 to B.9. Beginning with step one, the top-down method requires the applicant
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5. Virginia’s State Implementation Plan
Virginia’s SIP is administered by an Air Pollution Control Board
(“SAPCB”) endowed with wide discretion in developing regulations.123
Three basic types of emission control strategies are undertaken in the
state SIP: “stationary source control measures, which limit emissions
primarily from commercial/industrial facilities and operations . . . [m]obile
source control measures which limit tailpipe and other emissions primarily
from motor vehicles . . . [and] transportation control measures, which
limit the location and use of motor vehicles . . . .”124 Regulations promul-
gated by the SAPCB are contained in the Virginia Administrative Code
at Title 9.125 The NAAQS for example are incorporated into the Code at
Title 9, Chapter 30.126
As required by the CAA, the Administrative Code mandates that
BACT be applied in new major stationary sources of emissions for “each
regulated NSR pollutant.”127
to identify all available control technology options for the proposed facility for each
regulated pollutant. Id. at B.5. Under the BACT definition, these technologies include
“production processes and available methods, systems, and techniques, including fuel
cleaning, clean fuels, or treatment or innovative fuel combustion techniques.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 7479 (2006). Under step two, the reviewer eliminates technically infeasible options.
See NEW SOURCE REVIEW WORKSHOP MANUAL, supra note 118, at B.7. This requires
a documented demonstration that technical difficulties, such as physical, chemical or
engineering principles, would prevent successful use of the control technology at the
proposed facility. Id. Step three involves a ranking of the control technologies by
effectiveness. Id. at B.7. In step four, the reviewer analyzes the economic, environmental,
and energy impacts, both beneficial and adverse. Id. at B.8. If the reviewer proves the top
technology to be inappropriate for the facility, that technology is eliminated, and the next
most stringent technology is similarly evaluated. Id. at B.8. to B.9. This process continues
until a technology cannot be eliminated based on environmental, energy, or economic
impacts, and that technology is then proposed as the BACT for the pollutant and emission
under review. Id. at B.9. Finally, in step five, the most effective emission control option
not rejected in step four is selected as the BACT. Id.
123 See The State Implementation Plan, VA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY (Dec. 7, 2009),
http://www.deq.virginia.gov/air/planning/sips.html. The Board is governed by VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 10.1300–1328 (2009).
124 VA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 123.
125 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 5-5-10 et seq. (2010).
126 Id. §§ 5-30-10 to 5-30-80.
127 Id. § 5-50-280(B) (“A major stationary source shall apply best available control
technology for each regulated NSR pollutant (as defined in 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE  § 5-80-
1615) that it would have the potential to emit in significant amounts.”). These pollutants
are defined by the Code as, “[a]ny pollutant for which an ambient air quality standard
has been promulgated and any constituents or precursors for such pollutants identified
2010] SO MUCH UP IN THE AIR 285
6. Last Ditch Litigation
Having failed to derail VCHEC before the SCC, the conservation
groups made one final attempt to block the application by appealing two
permitting decisions by the SAPCB in Richmond Circuit Court.128 The
groups, with lawyers from the Southern Environmental Law Center, chal-
lenged the SAPCB decision on seven grounds, “three addressing the MACT
permit and four addressing the PSD permit.”129 Most interesting for the
purposes of this note was the claim, raised by the conservation groups, that
Dominion should have been required to conduct BACT analysis for
CO2.130 This claim is based on a dispute about whether CO2 is subject to
regulation under the CAA. As noted above, if CO2 were a pollutant subject
to regulation under the CAA, provisions of the Act requiring BACT for
new sources would be automatically triggered.131 The petitioner conserva-
tion groups made two claims with regard to CO2. First, they argued that
as a result of the Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts v. EPA,132
CO2 is now recognized as a “pollutant” for the purposes of the CAA.133
Second, the petitioner argued that CO2 had been made subject to regula-
tion under the CAA and Virginia’s SIP134 because of “longstanding [since
1993] Clean Air Act regulations applicable to carbon dioxide.”135 The
regulations referred to came into effect as a result of the 1990 CAA
Amendments and require monitoring of CO2 emissions.136 The petitioners
by the administrator . . . [a]ny pollutant that is subject to any standard promulgated under
§ 111 of the federal Clean Air Act . . . [a]ny class I or II substance subject to a standard
promulgated under or established by Title VI of the federal Clean Air Act; or . . . [a]ny
pollutant that otherwise is subject to regulation under the federal Clean Air Act . . . .”
Id. § 5-80-1615.
128 Appalachian Voices v. State Air Pollution Control Bd., No. CL08003530-00, slip op. at
2 (Va. Cir. Aug. 10, 2009).
129 Id. The court rejected each of these claims. Id. at 2–4.
130 Opening Brief of Petitioners at 42, Appalachian Voices v. State Air Pollution Control
Bd., No. CL08003530-00 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 12, 2009).
131 NEW SOURCE REVIEW WORKSHOP MANUAL, supra note 118, at B.1.
132 549 U.S. 497, 528–29 (2007). For further analysis of this decision and the Court’s view
of carbon dioxide, see infra Part II.
133 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 130, at 43 (noting that the Court found that
“greenhouse gases fit well within the Clean Air Act’s capacious definition of ‘air pollutant’”)
(quoting Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007)).
134 See VA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, supra note 123 for the text of the Virginia SIP
language under which this claim is brought.
135 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 130, at 44 (citing In re Deseret Power Elec. Coop., PSD
Appeal No. 07-03, slip op. at 41 (EAB Nov. 13, 2008)).
136 See 42 U.S.C. § 7651k (2006) (“Monitoring.—the [EPA] . . . shall promulgate regulations
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argued that “[i]t would defy common sense to argue that this monitoring
and reporting program under the CAA does not amount to ‘regulation.’ ”137
The claim, if accepted, would presumably have required Dominion
to conduct the five-part BACT analysis detailed above. However, it is un-
clear what BACT for carbon dioxide would mean at this time.138 The EPA
is currently considering this question,139 which is a thorny one as there
are few proven technologies to reduce or capture CO2, and there may
currently be no economically satisfactory solution to significantly reduce
CO2 emissions.140
City of Richmond Circuit Court Judge Margaret Poles Spencer did
not accept the conservation groups’ invitation to find that carbon dioxide
was subject to BACT regulation.141 Instead, she agreed with the EPA
position that:
[t]he term “subject to regulation” refers to pollutants sub-
ject to actual emission limitations. . . . No federal or state
regulatory controls have been established for carbon diox-
ide, and therefore it was not “subject to regulation” at the
time the permit was issued. In sum, there is no authority,
as a matter of fact or law, for the claim that a BACT analy-
sis, to determine compliance with an unknown limitation,
was required for carbon dioxide.142
The conservation groups appealed this claim to the Court of Appeals of
Virginia where it was affirmed May 25, 2010.143
within 18 months after the enactment of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 . . . to
require that all affected sources subject to . . . [Title IV] . . . of the Clean Air Act . . . shall
also monitor carbon dioxide emissions. . . . The regulations shall require that such data
be reported to the Administrator.”).
137 Brief of Petitioners, supra note 130, at 46.
138 See Siobhan Hughes, Emission Critical: EPA Ruling On CO2 Controls Could Boost
Gas, DOW JONES FACTIVA (Feb. 11, 2010), available at http://www.brocktoncleanenergy
.com/2010/02/emission-critical-epa-ruling-on-co2-controls-could-boost-gas/.
139 See id.
140 See Daniel Brian, Note, Regulating Carbon Dioxide Under the Clean Air Act as a Haz-
ardous Air Pollutant, 33 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 369, 391–92 (2008).
141 Appalachian Voices v. State Air Pollution Control Bd., No. CL08003530-00, slip op. at
3 (Va. Cir. Aug. 10, 2009).
142 Id.
143 See Appalachian Voices v. State Air Pollution Control Bd., 693 S.E.2d 295 (Va. Ct. App.
2010). The appeals court noted that “[b]ecause no provision of the CAA or Virginia law
controls or limits CO[2] emissions, CO[2] is not a pollutant ‘subject to regulation.’ Therefore,
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With one exception thatwas quickly reversed,144 courts around the
country hearing the “subject to regulation” claim have agreed with Judge
Spencer.145 The EPA, for its part, has strongly opposed the above inter-
pretation of section 169, arguing that pollutants “subject to regulation”
include only those “subject to either a provision in the Clean Air Act or
regulation promulgated by the EPA under the Clean Air Act that requires
actual control of emissions of that pollutant.”146 The trend among these
courts is clearly towards deference to this interpretation, and to the
leadership of Congress and the EPA.147 Until recently, neither of these
bodies have been much interested in taking the lead. Although state courts
have been reluctant to reach onto what they view as political turf, the
Supreme Court has taken a surprisingly active role in prodding the other
branches of government to regulate greenhouse gases (“GHGs”).
CO[2] is not a ‘regulated NSR pollutant’ under the PSD permitting program, and the
Board was not required to complete a BACT analysis to establish permit limits for CO[2]
emissions at the time it issued the VCHEC permit.” Id. at 301.
144 Friends of the Chattahoochee v. Longleaf Energy Assocs., No. 2008CV146398 (Fulton
County Super. Ct. June 30, 2008), rev’d, 681 S.E.2d 203 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009) cert. denied,
2009 Ga. LEXIS 809 (Ga. 2009).
145 See, e.g., Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 376 (2d Cir. 2009) (“EPA
does not currently regulate carbon dioxide under the CAA—at least not in the sense that
EPA requires control of such emissions at this time.”); In re Otter Tail Power Co., 2008
SD 5, ¶ 31, 744 N.W.2d 594, 603 (declining to weigh in on the impact of carbon emissions
on global warming, and noting that a “resolution for this problem, critical though it is,
cannot be made in the isolation of judicial proceedings”); Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club
v. Air Quality Bd., 29 UT 76, 226 P.3d 719, 719 (rejecting the claim that carbon dioxide
was “subject to regulation” and deferring to the Air Quality Board’s decision); In re Basin
Elec. Power Coop., Dry Fork Station, EQC Docket No. 07-2801, 2008 Wyo. ENV LEXIS
3 (Wyo. Envtl. Quality Council Aug. 21, 2008) (declining to determine how to regulate
carbon emissions without specific EPA guidance).
146 See Memorandum from Stephen L. Johnson, Administrator, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency to
Regional Administrators 6 (Dec. 18, 2008) (detailing the EPA’s interpretation of regulations
that determine pollutants covered by federal PSD permit program), available at http://
www.epa.gov/NSR/documents/psd_interpretive_memo_12.18.08.pdf.
147 Despite the resistance, these claims have encountered in state courts, as typified by the
Richmond City Circuit Court decision in Appalachian Voices, the broader principle that
government agencies must consider options for reducing greenhouse gas emissions when
acting in a regulatory capacity has found some support in the federal courts. See, e.g.,
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Transp. Safety Admin., 508 F.3d 508,
531–36 (9th Cir. 2007) (the Ninth Circuit held that a federal agency acted unlawfully by
failing to assess the benefits of reducing carbon dioxide emissions when setting fuel
economy standards for light trucks). For a regularly updated index of environmental law
cases filed under various statutes including the CAA, see Michael B. Gerrard & J. Cullen
Howe, Climate Case Chart: Climate Change Litigation in the U.S., ARNOLD & PORTER
LLP, http://www.climatecasechart.com/ (last updated Sept. 12, 2010).
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II. MASSACHUSETTS V. EPA148
In 2007, the Supreme Court weighed in on global warming, ruling
that the EPA not only had the authority to regulate GHGs,149 but, should
it find that GHGs endanger public welfare, the EPA was required to regu-
late.150 The petitioners, a group of states, local governments, and environ-
mental organizations had challenged the EPA’s conclusion that GHGs were
not subject to the regulatory provisions of the CAA.151 Petitioners further
alleged that the EPA had failed to make a “serious scientific inquiry” into
whether GHGs may “reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare,” as required by the CAA.152
The case brought together an initially unlikely coalition: two large
energy companies, Entergy and Calpine, joined the aforementioned parties
in supporting regulation.153 Entergy’s brief is instructive for the purposes
of this note; in it, the company urged regulation in order to allow energy
producers a stable regulatory regime in which to plan long-term strategies.
The energy needs of the United States are expected to dou-
ble over the next 50 years, and Entergy and its fellow
industry members need to plan—and act—now for the
strategic capital investments—viewed on a 25-year hori-
zon—that will be necessary to meet this increased de-
mand. Entergy seeks certainty with respect to the regula-
tory regime it must operate under, and does not believe that
EPA’s current position on CO2 regulation will stand the test
of time.
148 549 U.S. 497 (2007). For an interesting insider account of this case written by the lead
author of the petitioners’ ultimately winning brief, see Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change
in the Supreme Court, 38 ENVTL. L. 1 (2008).
149 Massachusetts  v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. at 500 (“Because greenhouse gases fit
well within the Clean Air Act’s capacious definition of ‘air pollutant,’ we hold that EPA
has the statutory authority to regulate . . . .”).
150 Id. at 533.
151 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 8–11, Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S.
497 (2007) (No. 05-1120).
152 Id. at 2. As noted above, the CAA requires the EPA administrator to set standards for
air pollutants emitted by new motor vehicles when, in the judgment of the EPA, those
pollutants will “cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated
to endanger public health or welfare.” 42 U.S.C. 7521(a)(1) (2006).
153 See Brief of Entergy Corp. as Amicus Curaie in Support of Petitioners, Massachusetts
v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Brief of Calpine Corp. as Amicus Curaie
Supporting Petitioners, Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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. . . EPA’s refusal to recognize its authority to regulate CO2
fails to appropriately incentivize the development of envi-
ronmentally responsible power generation to satisfy the
nation’s energy demand.154
The Court’s opinion was in three parts.155 First, the Court held that
Massachusetts had standing to challenge the EPA’s decision not to regulate
certain GHGs.156 The Court found that land loss due to rising seas caused
by global warming was a sufficiently particularized harm to the state to
justify standing, and that the EPA’s failure to regulate contributed to
Massachusetts’s injuries.157 The Court further held that the land loss
alleged was “actual and imminent,” and that there was a “substantial
likelihood that the judicial relief requested [would] prompt EPA to take
steps to reduce that risk.”158 The Court partially grounded its decision in
a “special solicitude” extended to states in exchange for their surrender
of independent power to set environmental policy.159 Second, the Court
found that the broad CAA definition of “air pollutants” authorized the
regulation of GHGs.160 Third, and perhaps most important,161 the Court
held that while the EPA has discretion with regard to the
manner, timing, content, and coordination of its regula-
tions . . . [the] EPA can avoid taking further action only if
it determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to
154 Brief of Entergy Corp., supra note 153, at 3–4.
155 See Peter S. Glaser & Douglas A. Henderson, Massachusetts v. EPA Global Warming
Decision: What Does It Mean?, 22 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 48, 48 (2007).
156 See 549 U.S. at 516–523. “EPA’s steadfast refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions
presents a risk of harm to Massachusetts that is both ‘actual’ and ‘imminent.’ There is,
moreover, a ‘substantial likelihood that the judicial relief requested’ will prompt EPA to
take steps to reduce that risk.” (internal citation omitted). Id. at 521. See also Randall S.
Abate, Massachusetts v. EPA and the Future of Environmental Standing in Climate
Change Litigation and Beyond, 33 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 121, 145 (2008).
157 Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. at 522–23.
158 Id. at 521.
159 Id. at 519–20. See also Dru Stevenson, Special Solicitude for State Standing:
Massachusetts v. EPA, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 1, 5–8 (2007) (discussing state standing to
sue federal agencies).
160 Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. at 528–29. (“The Clean Air Act’s
sweeping definition of ‘air pollutant’ includes ‘any air pollution agent or combination of
such agents, including any physical, chemical . . . substance or matter which is emitted
into or otherwise enters the ambient air. . . .’ ” (emphasis in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7602(g) (2006))).
161 See Glaser & Henderson, supra note 155, at 48.
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climate change or if it provides some reasonable explana-
tion as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion
to determine whether they do.162
Although the Court did not go so far as to require the EPA to make an
endangerment finding that would have required it to regulate GHGs
immediately,163 the message sent by the Court was clear—the EPA
should stop dragging its feet in regulating GHGs.164 The decision gave
the EPA the option of making an endangerment finding which would
automatically trigger regulation under the CAA or to “find that science
at this point does not justify the conclusion that [greenhouse gases]
endanger public health and welfare.”165
Crucially, however, the decision was grounded entirely in the statu-
tory law of the CAA, meaning that Congress retains its prerogative to
determine the ultimate direction the EPA will take with regard to carbon
regulation.166
A. Reaction to the Decision
As might be expected, reaction to the case has been mixed, with
scholars criticizing the approach to judicial review,167 applauding168 or
decrying169 the expansion of parens patriae, and reading tea leaves as to
the effect of the ruling on everything from state attorneys general,170 to
162 Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. at 533.
163 Id. at 534 (“We need not and do not reach the question whether on remand EPA must
make an endangerment finding . . . .”).
164 See Charles de Saillan, United States Supreme Court Rules EPA Must Take Action on
Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Massachusetts v. EPA, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 793, 805, 814
(2007) (stating that the Court’s decision “will make it more difficult for the EPA to avoid
addressing the global warming issue in the future.”).
165 Glaser & Henderson, supra note 155, at 49.
166 See Beermann, supra note 10, at 732.
167 Michael Sugar, Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 31 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 531, 544 (2007) (“[R]egardless of its ultimate effect, Massachusetts v. EPA has
produced a doctrine of judicial review that lacks coherence and rationality.”).
168 Ryke Longest, Massachusetts versus EPA: Parens Patriae Vindicated, 18 DUKE ENVTL.
L. & POL’Y F. 277, 286–87 (2008); Sara Zbeb, From Georgia v. Tennessee Copper to
Massachusetts v. EPA: Parens Patriae Standing for State Global-Warming Plaintiffs, 96
GEO. L. J. 1059, 1067 (2008).
169 See Ronald A. Cass, Massachusetts v. EPA: The Inconvenient Truth About Precedent,
93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 75, 78 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/05
/21/cass.pdf.
170 See Stevenson, supra note 159, at 9–10 (predicting that national issues will have more
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the role of Congress.171 Much of the academic literature has focused on
whether the CAA structure is well-suited to regulating CO2.172 Numerous
scholars have argued that the CAA, which was designed to target the
emission of localized pollutants, does not offer an ideal framework for
regulating GHGs,173 which when released, disperse widely throughout
the atmosphere.174 Professor Nordhaus has argued, for example, that
because of gaps in the potential coverage of CO2 (and other
GHG) emissions, impediments to the establishment of a
national cap-and-trade system, and limitations on the
control of motor vehicle emission, a regulatory program
under the CAA would be significantly less effective and
more costly than a program specifically designed to control
GHG emissions.175
B. The Next Shoe to Drop
Despite these much discussed deficiencies, the EPA under the
Obama administration has begun to move to comply with the
Massachusetts v. EPA holding.176 According to a finding proposed April 24,
resonance in state Attorney General races given the ease with which states can sue
under the “special solicitude doctrine”).
171 See Jason Scott Johnston, Climate Change Confusion and the Supreme Court: The
Misguided Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 84 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1, 57 (2008) (“[B]y compelling EPA to regulate, the Court has radically
changed the stakes in congressional bargaining over possible federal legislation and
consequently made socially desirable, efficient federal greenhouse gas legislation much
less likely.”). See also Beermann, supra note 10, at 732 (noting that “the Court placed
responsibility for global warming policy on Congress”).
172 See Robert R. Nordhaus, New Wine Into Old Bottles: The Feasibility of Greenhouse Gas
Regulation Under the Clean Air Act, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 53, 54 (2007). See also Arnold
W. Reitze, Jr., Electric Power In a Carbon Constrained World, 34 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L.
& POL’Y REV. 821, 932–33 (2010).
173 One example of the many problems presented by regulation under the CAA, as noted
by Professor Reitze, is that under the current CAA, the EPA would have to set threshold
NAAQS standards either above or below current atmospheric levels. Arnold W. Reitze,
Jr., Federal Control of Carbon Emissions: What Are the Options? 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 1, 4 (2009). This would either immediately throw the entire country into non-
attainment with no real expectation that any measure implemented would lead to a
short-term reduction in global CO2 levels, or leave the entire country in compliance with
the standard, with little need to implement further emission reduction plans. Id. at 4–5.
174 See TIM FLANNERY, THE WEATHER MAKERS 22 (2005).
175 See Nordhaus, supra note 172, at 54.
176 Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases
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2009, the emission of six GHGs—carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide,
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulfur hexafluoride—endangers
public health and welfare of current and future generations.177 The pro-
posed finding also stated that the emission of four GHGs—carbon diox-
ide, methane, nitrous oxide, and hydrofluorocarbons—from new motor
vehicles and new motor vehicle engines contributes to atmospheric concen-
trations of these GHGs and the threat of climate change.178
Subsequently, on September 28, 2009, the EPA and the Depart-
ment of Transportation’s National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
published a proposed regulation in establishing tailpipe emission limits
for carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide for “passenger cars, light-
duty trucks, and medium-duty passenger vehicles, covering model years
2012 through 2016.”179 Once this regulation is officially promulgated,
GHGs, including CO2, will be subject to regulation under the CAA, and
the six gases listed will be subject to the Prevention of Serious Deteriora-
tion regulation discussed above as well as the operating permit program
regulations contained in the CAA’s Title V.180
When this happens, the weaknesses of the CAA as a framework
for CO2 regulation will immediately become apparent. Under the PSD
program, any “major source”181 which emits more than twenty-five tons
of regulated pollutants per year (“tpy”)182 of CO2 or carbon-dioxide equiv-
alent (CO2e) is required to submit a compliance plan and permit applica-
tion within one year of becoming subject to the Title V program.183 While
twenty-five tpy may be a relatively large amount of traditionally regu-
lated CAA pollutants, CO2 is emitted on a dramatically larger scale.184 The
Under Selection Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 18886, 18886-910
(proposed Apr. 24, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. ch. 1).
177 Id. at 18898.
178 Id. at 18886
179 Proposed Rulemaking to Establish Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission
Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards, 74 Fed. Reg. 49454, 49454
(proposed Sept. 28, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 86, 600 and 49 C.F.R. pts. 531,
533, 537, 538).
180 SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP, EPA PROPOSES GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS THRESHOLDS FOR CLEAN AIR ACT PERMIT PROGRAMS 2 (2009), available at www
.skadden.com/content/Publications/Publications1897_0.pdf [hereinafter SKADDEN MEMO].
181 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (2006).
182 Id.
183 Id. § 7661(b).
184 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES IN
THE UNITED STATES 2007, at 1 fig.1 (2008) (estimating energy-related carbon dioxide
emissions in the U.S. at 5,916.7 million tons in 2007).
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EPA estimates that more than six million existing GHG emitters (who
currently fall below the threshold) would become subject to the Title V
operating permit program.185 This level of regulation is currently not
feasible, both for state permitting authorities to enforce, and for the
millions of small companies required to comply.186 In order to avoid this
outcome, the EPA has proposed a Tailoring Rule which would raise the
threshold to 25,000 tpy.187 Although the EPA has attempted to effect this
change by regulation, relying on “administrative necessity” and “absurd
results” doctrines,188 the agency may have difficulty defending this
rulemaking if challenged, given the clear language of the CAA that it is
effectively changing.189
C. The Great Carbon Dioxide Debate: What to Do?
As noted, Congress retains the power to mandate how GHGs will
be regulated, and may create a structure for regulating the gases outside
of the current CAA framework.190 Given the unsuitability of regulation
of CO2 under the CAA, and the dubious legality of the EPA’s efforts to
shoehorn regulations into the existing framework, it seems natural that
Congress would step in to cut the Gordian knot and establish a new frame-
work for tackling global warming.
Where the 91st Congress “reflect[ed] congressional dissatisfaction
with the progress of existing air pollution programs”191 in 1970 by passing
“a drastic remedy to what was perceived as a serious and otherwise un-
checkable problem of air pollution,”192 the 111th Congress has thus far
failed to embrace a similarly “aspirational”193 approach to tackling climate
change. In part, this reflects the complexity of the tradeoffs that must
be made in assigning the costs and benefits of new legislation.194 It also
185 See Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55292, 55295 (proposed Oct. 27, 2009) (to be codified as 40 C.F.R. pts.
51, 52, 70, 71).
186 Id. at 55292.
187 Id. at 55295.
188 Id. at 55292.
189 See SKADDEN MEMO, supra note 181, at 3.
190 See Beermann, supra note 10, at 732.
191 See Giovinazzo, supra note 106, at 112 (quoting Union Elec. Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
427 U.S. 246, 249 (1976)).
192 Id. at 113 (quoting Union Elec. Co. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 427 U.S. 246, 256 (1967).
193 Id. at 99.
194 See Johnston, supra note 171, at 18–20.
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likely reflects continued skepticism about the underlying science of global
warming, despite all evidence to the contrary.195
The delay is not for lack of proposals. In the 105th Congress
(1997–1998) a mere seven bills dealing with climate change were intro-
duced,196 by the 109th (2005–2006) there were over 106 bills, amend-
ments, and resolutions.197 The 111th Congress has been no less active: on
June 26, 2009, the House of Representatives passed the American Clean
Energy and Security Act of 2009.198 The Bill, commonly known as the
Waxman-Markey Bill after its principal sponsors, contains five titles.199
Title I institutes a federal renewable electricity and efficiency standard,200
regulates carbon capture and sequestration technology,201 institutes new
performance standards for new coal-fueled power plants,202 and provides
funds for research and development of a variety of energy efficient
technologies.203 Title II includes provisions related to building,204
195 The skeptics in Congress are led by Sen. James Inhofe (R-Okla.), who continues to
fiercely oppose any and all climate legislation, and to question the “consensus” on climate
science. See Key Issues—View; Environment, JAMES M. INHOFE; U.S. SENATOR-OKLAHOMA,
http://inhofe.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=KeyIssues.View&Issue
_id=4afeb468-d083-8a0b-ce78-0731b2c4df61&CFID=57871585&CFTOKEN=41248603
(last visited Oct. 2, 2010); MINORITY STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC
WORKS, 111TH CONG. ‘CONSENSUS’ EXPOSED: THE CRU CONTROVERSY 1 (Comm. Print 2010).
Such attacks on the legitimacy of climate science by fringe politicians gives political cover
to more moderate politicians to oppose legislation.
196 See Legislation in the 109th Congress Related to Global Climate Change, PEW CTR. ON
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.pewclimate.org/federal/congress/109 (last visited
Oct. 20, 2010).
197 Legislation in the 110th Congress Related to Global Climate Change, PEW CTR. ON
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.pewclimate.org/federal/congress/110 (last visited
Oct. 20, 2010) (these included various cap-and-trade proposals, resolutions calling for partici-
pation in international climate change negotiations, funding for climate change research,
as well as “scores of bills that address energy efficiency, energy security, new technology
research, agriculture, resource management, national security, and wildlife preservation”).
198 H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009).
199 See H.R. 2454: American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, GOVTRACK.US, http://
www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-2454 (last visited Oct. 20, 2010); H.R. 2454
§ 1, 111th Cong. (2009).
200 H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 101 (2009). See also Joshua P. Fershee, Changing Resources,
Changing Market: The Impact of a National Renewable Portfolio Standard on the U.S.
Energy Industry, 29 ENERGY L.J. 49, 52 (2008).
201 H.R. 2454 § 112, 111th Cong. (2009).
202 Id. § 116.
203 See, e.g., id. §§ 141–46 (promoting smart grid technology).
204 Id. § 201.
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lighting,205 appliance,206 and vehicle energy efficiency programs.207 Title IV
includes provisions to preserve domestic competitiveness and support
workers,208 provide assistance to consumers,209 and support domestic210
and international adaptation initiatives.211 Titles III and V contain the
meat of the Bill—a cap-and-trade program designed to limit emissions of
six GHGs from roughly 7400 energy producers212 including CO2, methane
and nitrous oxide, to increasingly strict national quotas.213
In the first year of the cap-and-trade program envisioned by
Waxman-Markey, emissions allowances would be set at ninety-seven of the
emissions from covered entities in 2009.214 Allowances would then decline
every few years until 2050 when emissions under the program are projected
to be fourteen percent of what they would be under a business-as-usual
approach.215 In addition to emission allowances, Waxman-Markey would
also allow companies to purchase domestic or international carbon
offsets.216 The CBO estimates that emission allowances for one metric ton
of CO2e would vary in price from fifteen dollars per metric ton of CO2e
(“mtCO2e”) initially to twenty-six dollars per mtCO2e in 2019.217
While utilities that are dependent on carbon intensive processes
may see a substantial increase in their cost of production, those with
low carbon portfolios—such as those utilizing nuclear, hydroelectric, and
wind/solar generation—may see substantial windfall profits.218 The Bill
205 Id. § 211.
206 Id. § 212. 
207 H.R. 2454 § 222, 111th Cong. (2009).
208 Id. § 421.
209 Id. § 431.
210 Id. § 451.
211 Id. § 491.
212 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE: H.R. 2454 AMERICAN CLEAN ENERGY AND
SECURITY ACT OF 2009 4 (2009), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/102xx/doc10262/
hr2454.pdf [hereinafter Waxman-Markey Cost Estimate]. “According to CBO’s estimates,
the programs would cover . . . about 78 percent [of U.S. emissions] in 2015, and about 86
percent in 2020.” Id.
213 See At a Glance; American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, PEW CTR. ON
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/Waxman-Markey-short
-summary-revised-June26.pdf.
214 Waxman-Markey Cost Estimate, supra note 213, at 5.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 6.
217 Id. at 12.
218 Ezra D. Hausman et al., Productive and Unproductive Costs of CO2 Cap-and-Trade:
Impacts on Electricity Consumers and Producers, SYNAPSE ENERGY ECONOMICS INC. 4–5
(2009), http://www.nasuca.org/archive/Synapse%20Report-7-15-09.pdf.
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attempts to mitigate this imbalance by offering various incentives and sub-
sidies to companies which implement clean coal technology.219
With the passage of Waxman-Markey in the House, the focus has
moved to the Senate where, somewhat unsurprisingly,220 progress
has slowed to a crawl.221 Once again, the delay is not for lack of propos-
als— there are at least five major bill proposals vying for attention from
the four separate committees with jurisdiction over the legislation.222
These bills vary widely in approach223 and stringency.224 Uncertainty
about the shape of the ultimate regulatory program also extends to the
costs associated which are expected to be dramatic under any plan that
seriously addresses the issue.225
219 See In Brief: What the Waxman-Markey Bill Does for Coal, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE (2009), http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/brief-what-waxman-markey-does
-for-coal-oct2009.pdf (suggesting that “a suite of technologies exists—known as carbon
capture and storage—that can enable coal to play a significant role in a low-carbon energy
future”). But see Parenteau, supra note 12, at 1460 (“Unfortunately, carbon capture and
sequestration (CCS) has not been demonstrated on a commercial scale and estimates are
that, absent an accelerated R&D program and a major infusion of public funds, it could
take a decade or more before the technical, legal, and public acceptance hurdles to CCS
are overcome.”).
220 See ROBERT A. CARO, LYNDON JOHNSON: MASTER OF THE SENATE 1–49 (2002) (suggesting
that the Senate is, by design, a more ponderous body).
221 See John Harwood, No Clear Map for Democrats On Path to New Energy Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9. 2009, at A11 (suggesting that Congress is unlikely to pass a “cap-and-
trade” system in 2010).
222 See Climate Action in Congress, PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE http://www
.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_congress (last visited Oct. 20, 2010).
223 Compare Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act (CEJAPA), S. 1733, 111th Cong.
(2009) (as approved by S. Comm. On Env’t and Pub. Works, Nov. 5, 2009) (commonly known
as the Kerry-Boxer Bill, this proposal focuses primarily on reducing U.S. GHG
emissions), with Clean Energy Act of 2009, S. 2776, 111th Cong. (2009) (known as the
Alexander-Webb Bill, this proposal would simply expand inducements for constructing new
nuclear power plants), and Clean Energy Partnerships Act of 2009, S. 2729, 111th Cong.
(2009) (proposing an offset system to reward agriculture and forestry projects offsetting
carbon emissions).
224 Compare S. 1462, § 132(b) 111th Cong. (approved by S. Energy and Natural Res.
Comm. June 17, 2009) (containing Renewable Energy Standard targets: 2011–2013, 3.0%;
2014–2016, 6.0%; 2017–2018, 9.0%; 2019–2020, 12.0%; 2021–2039, 15.0%), with H.R.
2454 § 101(d), 111th Cong. (2009) (Waxman-Markey’s targets are 2012–2013, 6.0%;
2014–2015, 9.5%; 2016–2017, 13.0%; 2018–1019, 16.5%, 2020–2039, 20.0%).
225 See, e.g., Memorandum from Judson Jaffee, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury (Nov. 6, 2008)
(draft) (regarding domestic climate policy transition), available at http://www.openmarket
.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/FOIA-Cap-andTrade-2009-09-11.PDF. The draft memo
states that economic costs of climate change policies will “likely be on the order of 1% of GDP,
making them equal in scale to all existing environmental regulation,” and noting that
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III. STATE REGULATORY OPTIONS
While Congress has dithered, states have taken to their role as
“laboratories”226 of democracy with various GHG regulations of their
own.227 These regulations have taken a number of innovative forms
including “system benefit funds, appliance standards, building codes, farm
and forestland conservation programs, transportation efficiency measures,
alternative fuels mandates, solid waste management reform, industrial
process reform and other programs.”228 The overall effectiveness of these
approaches is hampered by the fact that they are not well coordinated
and create a patchwork of regulation.229 State programs to combat carbon
emissions—whether individually or in combination with other states—may
also suffer constitutional infirmities under the commerce, supremacy,
and compact clauses.230
Perhaps the most prevalent approach is the introduction of RPSs.231
Beginning in the mid-1980s with Iowa,232 and picking up steam through
the 1990s, to date, twenty-eight states have passed mandatory RPSs,233
and another five, including Virginia have passed voluntary standards.234
State RPSs typically require that a certain percentage of the electricity
long term cost estimates vary dramatically depending on the model used. Id.
226 New State Ice Co. v. Liebermann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
227 See Parenteau, supra note 12, at 1453; David Hurlbut, A Look Behind the Texas
Renewable Portfolio Standard: A Case Study, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 129, 129–30 (2008);
Michael Saunders, An Overview of Nevada’s Renewable Energy Portfolio Standard, 17
NEV. LAW. 6, 7 (2009).
228 Thomas D. Peterson, The Evolution of State Climate Change Policy in the United States:
Lessons Learned and New Directions, 14 WIDENER L.J. 81, 93 (2004).
229 See Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, The Hidden Costs of State Renewable
Portfolio Standards (RPS), 15 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 4–5, 7 (2007) (advocating a national
RPS program).
230 See Steven Ferrey, Goblets of Fire: Potential Constitutional Impediments to the
Regulation of Global Warming, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 835, 839–41 (2008).
231 See generally James W. Moeller, Of Credits and Quotas: Federal Tax Incentives for
Renewable Resources, State Renewable Portfolio Standards, and the Evolution of
Proposals for a Federal Renewable Portfolio Standard, 15 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 69,
97–131 (2004) (detailing the RPS approaches in fourteen states).
232 See Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 230, at 3.
233 See id. at 3.
234 See States with Renewable Portfolio Standards, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://apps1
.eere.energy.gov/states/maps/renewable_portfolio_states.cfm#chart (last updated June
16, 2009). The target goals and implementation dates for these different programs vary
widely from state to state. Pennsylvania, for example, requires eight percent of its electricity
to be produced from renewable sources by 2020, while California requires thirty-three
percent by 2030. Id.
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a utility produces be generated from renewable sources.235 The goals are
usually tiered, beginning at a modest level and increasing gradually over
time.236 By mandating the amount and timetable, but not the method,
this approach to regulation allows utilities significant flexibility to struc-
ture their portfolios as they see fit.237 Utilities that cannot meet the goals
set by the program may purchase credits for energy produced elsewhere
in order to bring their portfolio into compliance.238 Additionally, RPS stan-
dards do not appear to substantially raise consumer electricity bills.239
Unfortunately, RPSs also have a number of significant downsides
which limit effectiveness, particularly free rider problems and encourage-
ment of gaming due to differences in what constitutes renewable sources
from state to state.240 Individual states can bear substantial costs by
mandating an RPS, but benefits are not limited to their borders, allowing
neighboring states to enjoy the benefits of less combusted fossil fuels as
well as less expensive power.241 As noted above, the very fact that RPS pro-
grams are state-based means that they lack the coordinated scale and
comprehensiveness of a national program.242
A. Virginia’s Renewable Portfolio Standard
As noted above, Virginia passed an RPS in 2007.243 Instead of
mandating how much electricity must be generated from renewables,244
235 Renewable Portfolio Standards Fact Sheet, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (Apr. 2009),
http://www.epa.gov/chp/state-policy/renewable_fs.html.
236 See Moeller, supra note 232, at 97–131 (twelve of the fourteen states discussed had
tiered goals). A typical statute, from Massachusetts, requires four percent of electricity to
come from renewable sources in 2009, rising one percent each year thereafter through 2020
at fifteen percent. 225 Mass. Code Regs. § 14.07 (2010).
237 See Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 230, at 2–3 (noting that RPSs have three
advantages over “command-and-control” regulation: the costs are born by the utilities, not
the government; utilities have flexibility in reaching goals; and RPSs featuring tradable
credits will automatically phase out when the price of credits reaches zero).
238 See The Mechanics of a Renewable Portfolio Standard Applied at the State Level, AM.
WIND ENERGY ASS’N (Nov. 1997), http://www.awea.org/policy/rpsmechste.html.
239 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO
STANDARD OVERVIEW 2 (2005), http://nrel.gov/docs/fy05osti/37627.pdf (surveying eight
recent RPS programs and finding an average increase to residential customers of less than
five dollars per year).
240 See Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 230, at 9.
241 See id. at 9–11.
242 See id. at 7.
243 VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.2 (West 2009).
244 Qualifying renewable sources include “sunlight, wind, falling water, biomass, sustainable
2010] SO MUCH UP IN THE AIR 299
however, utilities are free to opt in if they choose.245 Qualifying utilities are
rewarded with a performance incentive of fifty basis points (0.5%).246 This
is just one of many weaknesses in the statute which, due to loopholes,
allows utilities to satisfy renewable energy goals “with significantly lower
quantities of renewable energy than the statute appears to require.”247
To take just a few of the more egregious of these loopholes, the goals are
tied to a base year, 2007, and do not rise with increased demand.248 There-
fore by 2025, when the goals reach their maximum of fifteen percent,249
the actual percentage of electricity required to be produced from renew-
ables will be far less than fifteen percent of the electricity produced in
that year.250 Moreover, electricity produced from wind and solar sources
are granted “double credit,”251 effectively halving the RPS goals.252 Fi-
nally, as noted in Part I, the Virginia RPS credits energy produced by
existing hydroelectric sources towards its RPS goals.253 While this was
perhaps necessary to prevent the sort of gaming of the system discussed
above,254 when combined with the extremely low goals set by the program,
the standard provides less than optimal incentives for the development of
new renewable sources of electricity.
Ultimately, state RPS standards are a stopgap measure and full
involvement and commitment by the federal government will be required
to tackle climate change.255 Regulation is coming.256 The question that re-
mains for this note is what Virginia should do in the meantime.
IV. SOLUTIONS FOR VIRGINIA
The foregoing has been intended to demonstrate that the regula-
tory environment regarding CO2 emissions is in a dramatic state of flux. It
or otherwise . . . energy from waste, municipal solid waste, wave motion, tides, and
geothermal power.” VA. CODE ANN. § 56-576 (2009).
245 Id. § 56-585.2(B). Applications to participate in the program are to be approved if there
is a “reasonable expectation” that a utility will be able to meet the RPS goals. Id.
246 Id. § 56-585.2(C).
247 See Curtis, supra note 49, at 775.
248 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-585.2(A), 56-585.2(D) (2009).
249 Id. § 56-585.2(D).
250 See Curtis, supra note 49, at 777.
251 VA. CODE ANN. § 56-585.2(C) (2009).
252 See Curtis, supra note 49, at 778.
253 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
254 See Sovacool & Cooper, supra note 230, at 9.
255 See Parenteau, supra note 12, at 1474.
256 See Hausman et al., supra note 219, at 1.
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seems clear, however, that new federal regulation will be passed in the
coming years.257 This regulation will likely raise the cost of producing
electricity from carbon intensive fuels.258 While it is probable that future
legislation will include subsidies to cushion the blow to the coal industry,
it seems inevitable that electric utilities with less carbon dependent
portfolios will be better situated than those which remain chained to “King
Coal.”259 In order to avoid this fate, Virginia should pursue policies aimed
at three goals: conservation, efficiency, and diversification.
A. Conservation and Efficiency
Energy conservation and efficiency improvements offer Virginia
the most cost-effective means of decreasing carbon emissions and control-
ling its energy future.260 A study comparing investments in energy effi-
ciency with new plant construction found that the first option offered
“substantially lower cost[s]” to Virginia consumers.261 Furthermore, the
possibilities for efficiency gains in Virginia are substantial. In a separate
study, conducted in 2008 by the American Council for an Energy-Effi-
cient Economy, entitled “Energizing Virginia,” the authors specifically
recommended adopting building energy codes, appliance efficiency
standards, manufacturing initiatives, and an Energy Efficiency Resource
Standard.262 If implemented successfully, this set of policies is projected to
save 10,000 gigawatt hours (“GWh”) of electricity, enough to meet eight
percent of Virginia’s energy needs in 2015.263 Although Virginia’s official
energy plan set a target of “reduc[ing] electric use by 10 percent by
2022,”264 it is unclear whether these goals are being actively pursued.265
Instead of permitting new coal plants, Virginia should invest heavily in
257 See id.
258 See id.
259 See Reitze, supra note 172, at 832–33 (arguing that emissions caps will be an impediment
to the expansion of the coal industry, and that the major losers will be Southeastern and
Midwestern states which are dependent on coal-fired electricity).
260 See THE VIRGINIA ENERGY PLAN, supra note 58, at 58.
261 See ASSESSING THE IMPACT, supra note 13, at ES-2 . It should be noted that this study,
while conducted by an independent consultant, was financed by Appalachian Voices.
262 AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON. (ACEEE), Energizing Virginia:
Efficiency First, iii (2008), http://www.aceee.org/research-report/e085 (click on hyperlink
to download report).
263 Id. at 40.
264 See THE VIRGINIA ENERGY PLAN, supra note 58, at 58.
265 Given that Virginia’s energy consumption is increasing dramatically, one would speculate
not. See supra note 26 and associated text.
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energy efficiency measures. Consumers have a direct stake in electricity
decisions in Virginia and, as a market-regulating state, they also have
a right to demand that decisions be made in their interest.266 Expenditures
on efficiency gains will ultimately save taxpayers money and reduce carbon
emissions.267 Moreover, if new coal power plants are to be constructed in
Virginia, they should be conditioned on the retiring of older, less efficient
plants in order to reduce net emissions.268
B. Diversification
In order to push companies to diversify their energy portfolios and
move away from carbon fuels, Virginia must strengthen and mandate its
Renewable Portfolio Standard in order to provide real incentives for compa-
nies to pursue new renewable sources of energy.269 Virginia is currently
near the middle of the pack in terms of net generation from renewables
with a total of 3709 MW.270 It is estimated that Virginia has a total
renewable capacity of between 14,700–47,750 MW including at least 930
MW of economical near-term development potential.271 The addition of just
this near-term capacity could eliminate the need to build nearly two coal-
powered plants the size of the VCHEC.272
The goals of a revamped RPS should be: encouraging new energy
entrepreneurs to enter the market; allowing small-scale renewable
energy providers to supply energy to the grid; allowing fair market
266 See supra Part I.
267 See ASSESSING THE IMPACT, supra note 13, at ES-1 to ES-2.
268 In fact, this appears to have been done to some extent in the VCHEC case. Dominion
agreed to convert its Bremo Power Station in Fluvanna from coal to natural gas. See
Stephen Igo, Air Board Unanimously Approves Permits for Dominion Power Plant in St.
Paul, TIMESNEWS.NET (Jun. 25, 2008), http://www.timesnews.net/article.php?id=9006950.
However, it is unclear whether Dominion would have made the upgrade regardless because
its Bremo plant was the oldest, with generating units in operation since 1950 and 1958.
See Power Station, DOMINION RESOURCES, INC., http://www.dom.com/about/stations
/fossil/bremo-power-station.jsp (last accessed Oct. 20, 2010).
269 See Curtis, supra note 49, at 791–92.
270 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 2008 Renewable Electricity Listed
Alphabetically by State (Aug. 2010),  http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/solar.renewables/page/
state _profiles/sum_table.html. In 2008, Virginia was twenty-second in the nation in net
energy production from renewables. Id.
271 THE VA. CTR. FOR COAL AND ENERGY RESEARCH, VA POLYTECHNIC INST. & STATE UNIV.,
A STUDY OF INCREASED USE OF RENEWABLE ENERGY RESOURCES IN VIRGINIA 19
(2005), available at http://www.energy.vt.edu/Publications/Incr_Use_Renew_Energy_VA
_rev1.pdf.
272 See DOMINION RESOURCES, INC., supra note 4. The VCHEC will be a 585 MW facility. Id.
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competition to drive investment in the most cost-effective sources; per-
mitting utilities a fair rate-of-return; and ensuring that utility rates
remain affordable.273 While it is possible that a new RPS would be in
place for a short period of time before being preempted by federal regula-
tion,274 in the short term, ratepayers should not pay more for energy
unless utility companies are actually diversifying their portfolios.
CONCLUSION
The United States, and indeed the world, are in the midst of a great
debate about how to address global warming and climate change. There are
a variety of policy options available at both the federal and state level.275 If
passed, many of these options, which force producers to internalize the
costs of emissions, would likely make producing electricity from carbon
intensive fuels far less attractive.276 With so much uncertainty regarding
the future cost of producing electricity in this way, Virginia should take a
restrained approach to new coal plant permitting. Such an approach will
protect the consumer from higher rates and perhaps even manage to ad-
dress “the most pressing environmental challenge of our time.”277 In the
interim, investment in new renewable energy sources and conservation and
efficiency gains can help secure Virginia’s energy needs.
273 Accord Curtis, supra note 49, at 791–92.
274 See Hausman et al., supra note 219, at 1.
275 See, e.g., AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., supra note 263, at iii.
276 See Hausman et al., supra note 219, at 1, 4.
277 Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007) (internal citation omitted).
